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STEWARDSHIP 
Donald B. Ayer* 
It is not learning but the spirit of service that will give a college place in the 
public annals of the nation. 
-Woodrow Wilson 1 
I. THE DECLINE OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM 
In the second sentence of his article, Judge Edwards expresses the 
fear that "our law schools and law firms are moving in opposite direc-
tions. "2 While this is true in one sense- they seem today to have less 
and less to say to each other - it is false and misleading in another. 
For lawyers and law professors are moving in very much the same 
direction in their loss of a sense of stewardship for the law as an 
institution. 3 
What appears to have changed most on the law school side since I 
attended law school in the early 1970s is not the degree to which law 
school prepares one to practice law, but the degree of active disinter-
est, even disrespect and disdain, of many faculty members at elite insti-
tutions toward the work of practicing lawyers andjudges.4 Some view 
law as a subject matter inherently lacking in interest and so easy as not 
to deserve serious attention. 5 Many in the academy apparently view 
* Partner with Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue in Washington, D.C. Mr. Ayer has served in 
various positions in the U.S. Department of Justice. - Ed. 
1. Woodrow Wilson, Princeton in the Nation's Service, in 10 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW 
WILSON 30 (Arthur s. Link ed., 1971). 
2. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession, 91 MICHL. REV. 34, 34 (1992). 
3. Judge Edwards himself has previously remarked on this loss. See Harry T. Edwards, A 
Lawyer's Duty To Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148, 1161 (1990) (noting that an 
attitude like the profession's lack of "public spiritedness ... pervades our nation's law schools. 
This attitude excuses legal academics from confronting the problems facing the profession on the 
ground that theoretical contemplation should not be subordinated to the demands of legal 
practice."). 
4. There are apparently many more courses now that proceed on a theoretical level, suiting 
one to remake the world but not to function as a lawyer in this one. Thus, in the 1970s there was 
a greater likelihood of being taught a subject in a way that touched basic elements of legal doc-
trine. But those basic doctrinal courses likewise left students with little sense of what working as 
a lawyer would be like, and with no preparation in practical skills. The higher incidence today of 
clinical courses and of ethical instruction arguably makes current legal education more "practi-
cal" than formerly, at least in preparing one for a lawyer's day-to-day work. As set forth below, 
I believe that the measure of the academy's performance lies elsewhere than in how closely law 
school instruction anticipates law practice. 
5. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as 
University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 437-40 (1983) ("The social sciences ... deny the importance 
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law practitioners as several cuts below plumbers in both the intellec-
tual challenge and moral utility of their work. Imbued with this view, 
hundreds of law school graduates are sent forth each year to pursue a 
livelihood that they are encouraged to see as redeemed only by the 
lucre with which it will line their pockets, at least for awhile. 
As for law practice itself, it is certainly true that its character of 
life has fundamentally changed in recent years. The number of law-
yers has grown at an extraordinary pace. 6 Law practice has become 
more competitive and specialized, with an increased emphasis on se-
curing business, prompting the remark that it is now "more like a 
trade than a profession, with an emphasis on money and profit rather 
than on service and justice."7 With ever growing specialization, per-
sonal horizons have narrowed, hours have become longer, and the fo-
cus on law as an enterprise driven by the demands of the marketplace 
has become more and more central. 
Lost in both of these developments is the concept of the law as a 
vocation, in which the lawyer and the law professor owe principal du-
ties not only to self and to client (or to student), but to the courts, to 
the institution oflegal rules, and ultimately to the public. 8 It is a voca-
tion that demands both a measure of detachment and an ability to deal 
of law as a subject .... Today, virtually every law-school faculty member is able to teach every 
subject in the curriculum."). 
6. The 1992 Report of the ABA Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession states that in 
43 years we have moved from a total of 169,000 lawyers, or one per 790, in 1947-1948, to 
777,000, or one per 320, in 1990-1991. THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFES-
SION, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
- AN EDUCATIONAL CoNTINUUM (1992) 15 [hereinafter LEGAL EDUCATION). These figures 
are mirrored in other statistics, relating to such things as the percentage of GNP spent on legal 
services, the exponential rate of growth in the pages of legal publications, and the growth of 
federal regulatory agencies. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAW-
YERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 37-48 (1991). 
The usual interpretation of this remarkable growth trend is an ominous one, and there is no 
doubt that the numbers and resources commanded contribute greatly to the public's hostility to 
lawyers. Without suggesting that this phenomenon has been an unmixed blessing, or that it can 
or should continue indefinitely, there is much to be said for Dean Robert C. Clark's careful 
analysis arguing that the growth in the profession is responsive to real needs and productive of 
genuine benefits. Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 275 (1992) 
(ascribing the expansion in legal services in part to greater internationalization and other forms 
of interaction, greater diversity of population, changes in wealth levels, and greater involvement 
of the workforce in formal organizations). 
7. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Be-
tween Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1232 (1991). 
8. I make this claim with some hesitation, being far from the first to bemoan the decline of 
legal professionalism and conscious that one might wonder whether things can really be declin-
ing in this way for so long. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. 
REv. I, 2-5, 49 (1988) (including quotations from Louis Brandeis, Woodrow Wilson, and Harlan 
Stone to a similar effect). 
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with human problems.9 Thus, the traditional concept of the lawyer as 
a professional embodies not only duties to the legal system, but a role 
for the lawyer in helping a client focus his true interests, based on 
considerations of the law, ethical rules, and prudence.10 He thus offers 
legal advocacy tempered by wise counsel and dampens the stresses on 
the system otherwise arising from the pell-mell assertion of individual 
interests. 
More generally, the lawyer as professional bears a duty to look 
after the well-being of the system in which he works. Court work 
loads, the effective functioning of procedural rules, the education of 
young lawyers, and •the provision of service to those in need are just 
some of the concerns beyond client and self that weigh as his responsi-
bilities. In moving away from this broader concept of the lawyer's 
role, we are changing fundamentally the role that lawyers play in a 
way that diminishes both them and our system of justice. 11 Both the 
profession and the academy must provide a part of the solution. 
9. See Erwin N. Griswold, Law Schools and Human Relations, 1955 WASH. U. L.Q. 217 
(suggesting a need in law school curriculum for greater attention to issues of human relations). 
10. The lawyer's role as a counselor helping the client to realize his enlightened self-interest 
is well-illustrated by Archibald Cox's discussion of the lawyer's responsibility- when asked by 
his client to write his children out of his will - to 
remind the father of all the unhappy implications of what he proposes, to speak of the son's 
strength of character even though misdirected in the particular instance, and to suggest that 
if the client were to die in surgery and could return twenty years later, he would probably 
regret his decision. 
Archibald Cox, The Conditions of Independence for the Legal Profession, in THE LA WYER's 
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 60 (1984). 
11. Robert Gordon has examined the historical and analytical roots of the concept of legal 
professionalism to which I make reference here. Gordon's "Ideal of Law as a Public Profession" 
embodies the notion of a broader duty to public concerns as well as to the pursuit of individual 
client interests. He expresses his own view, with which I agree, that the "vision oflawyering as a 
public profession has real historical content .•• [and] tremendous •.• potential to transform 
lawyers' practical conceptions of their work in constructive ways." Gordon, supra note 8, at 11, 
13. 
Gordon's discussion of the ideal of the lawyer's public role in the early Republic and Paul 
Carrington's extensive account of the part played by law teachers at the same time bear particu-
larly upon my assertion that both the bar and the academy are moving away from roles as 
members of a public profession. Gordon notes: 
Lawyers were to be the guardians, in the face of threats posed by transitory political and 
economic powers, of the long-term values of legalism .... They are to repair defects in the 
framework of legality, to serve as policy intelligentsia, recommending improvements in the 
law to adapt it to changing conditions, and to use the authority and influence deriving from 
their public prominence and professional skill to create and disseminate, both within and 
without the context of advising clients, a culture of respect for and compliance with the 
purposes of the laws. 
Id. at 14 (footnote omitted). With regard to academics, Carrington observes that: 
Law teaching in America was a response to the fear that the Revolution would dissolve into 
disorder and despotism, the same fear that gave rise to the Constitution. A republic could 
stand only as long as the people maintained a measure of mutual trust. This appeared to 
require, at the very least, leadership that would merit general public trust. To win such 
trust, it was believed, the legal and political elite would need to pursue the classical republi-
can virtue of making and supporting public decisions based on selfless concern for the inter-
ests of all. 
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II. CHANGES IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
To some significant degree, I believe that the decline of legal pro-
fessionalism among practicing lawyers -.including the loss of notions 
of stewardship and service to institutional objectives greater than one-
self - is a product of forces outside of the profession. Only those in 
the law, however, can alter that trend. 
Judge Edwards has pointed to the self-indulgent, yuppie mentality 
of the 1980s and the professional amorality of the hired gun model of 
legal representation as the two principal culprits.12 Both of these have 
no doubt had a major impact upon the legal profession, but together 
they fall short of offering a full explanation. The excesses of the 1980s, 
of course, were pervasive, and something more specific to the law is 
necessary to explain the changes which have occurred there. The con-
cept of zealous advocacy of one's client's interest has high standing in 
the profession, and it has long been seized on by many in the law as a 
mandate to surrender their own moral compass. Moreover, zealous 
advocacy for one's client is an aspect of the advocate's professional 
identity that is fundamental to our adversary system of justice, and 
few would abandon it entirely - or even significantly.13 
There is another element to be considered, which will not be de-
nied by anyone who has lived in the private practice ~flaw for the past 
five years. It has affected adversely not only the practicing lawyer's 
dedication to a professional ideal of service and stewardship, but also 
the assimilation of new lawyers into the practice of law and the atti-
tudes of those in the academy toward the work of lawyers. It is the 
change that has occurred during the last decade or so in the nature of 
the legal marketplace. 
Law, like every other form of gainful economic activity, has been 
subjected in recent years to intense competitive pressures, so that en-
terprises have looked to the lawyers able to give the best assurance of 
realizing the business goals critical to a company's overall strategy.14 
Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law Teaching in a Democracy, 41 
DUKE L.J. 741, 756 (1992). 
12. Edwards, supra note 3, at 1153. 
13. Judge Edwards, for example, while identifying the "total commitment" model of legal 
representation as a principal culprit in the diminution of public spiritedness in the law, recog-
nizes its fundamental role in the context of litigation under the adversary theory on which our 
system is based. When all is said and done, he "accept[s] the classical understanding of the 
lawyer's obligation to represent her client as a partisan insofar as the lawyer is called upon by the 
legal system to be an advocate." His concern for the "suspension of independent moral judg-
ment" applies only "when the lawyer acts as a counselor." Id. at ·1154 n.28. 
14. While much has occurred in the last decade, recent developments are the logical onset of 
a sequence of events with much deeper roots. Starting around the turn of the century, the trans-
formation of law practice to an enterprise primarily concerned with the affairs of business has 
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Just as business has had to respond to immediate economic pressures 
to survive, law firms have had to meet the ever tightening demands of 
their clients for service measured in terms of concrete results. 15 
One of the most critical developments in the legal profession has 
been the breakdown of the old pattern of long-term relationships be-
tween law firms and clients. To a significant extent, clients now hire 
not law firms but individual lawyers - those in each area of practice 
who seem best positioned to deliver the desired result. Lawyers have 
scrambled to meet the market demand to be there the quickest with 
the most - with success measured in terms of helping clients to real-
ize their business objectives. In such an environment, only the most 
secure lawyers are likely to give the full benefit of their considered 
judgment when it is at odds with concerted corporate objectives.16 
In a world where reality influences perceptions but perceptions ul-
timately govern, lawyers have become active marketeers, spending 
substantial portions of their time on various types of business develop-
ment efforts, identifying and approaching clients as potential sources 
of the type of work they do. Much time is also spent writing articles 
focused and made more demanding the nature of the enterprise. Erwin N. Griswold, Educating 
Lawyers For A Changing World: A Challenge to Our Law Schools, 37 A.B.A. J, 805, 805 (1951). 
As Chief Justice Stone noted in 1934, it did not take long for that development to raise many of 
the concerns we feel today: 
The changed character of the lawyer's work has made it difficult for him to contemplate 
his function in its new setting, to see himself and his occupation in proper perspective. No 
longer does his list of clients represent a cross section of society; no longer do his contacts 
make him the typical representative and interpreter of the community. The demands of 
practice are more continuous and exacting. He has Jess time for reflection upon other than 
immediate professional undertakings. He is more the man of action, less the philosopher 
and less the student of history, economics, and government. 
The rise of big business has produced an inevitable specialization of the Bar. The suc-
cessful lawyer of our day more often than not is the proprietor or general manager of a new 
type of factory, whose legal product is increasingly the result of mass production methods. 
More and more the amount of his income is the measure of professional success. More and 
more he must look for his rewards to the material satisfactions derived from profits as from 
a successfully conducted business, rather than to the intangible and indubitably more dura-
ble satisfactions which are to be found in a professional service more consciously directed 
toward the advancement of the public interest. 
Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1934). 
15. One can anticipate an argument against a "tougher marketplace" explanation for the 
decline in public spiritedness, which relies on the substantial increases in the compensation of 
private practitioners experienced during the 1980s. My impression is that the substantial com-
pensation gains made in the boom years of the 1980s and before have in fact aggravated the 
pressures of the marketplace by becoming a floor for future expectations even in the less flush 
times we are now experiencing. For example, the great jump in associate salaries initiated by 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore in 1985, Gordon, supra note 8, at 60, which has been imitated and 
carried forward in succeeding years, has at the same time intensified the pressures which are 
often noted as making life unpleasant. 
16. It has thus been argued that although "lawyers in large firms adhere to an ideology of 
autonomy in their perceptions of both the role of legal institutions in society and the role of 
lawyers vis-a-vis clients ... this ideology has little bearing on their practice." Robert L. Nelson, 
Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the 
Large Firm, 37 STAN L. REV. 503, 504 (1985). 
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and giving presentations on legal subjects.17 
This increasingly competitive marketplace, in which long-term loy-
alties play a diminished role, is directly related to many aspects of 
legal practice that are unsettling to new law graduates.18 It has much 
to do with the all-consuming nature of legal work in a large firm, with 
very long hours and singleminded dedication to the pursuit of a good 
(measured in terms of the client's interest) result. In this respect, the 
law business is no different from all intensely competitive enterprises, 
which uniformly demand almost total dedication as the price of suc-
cess. This pressure also has everything to do with the drive for spe-
cialization: to become truly expert in a narrow discipline and thus to 
be the one called upon as best qualified when that particular need 
arises. 
Some of the criticism of present-day law practice takes the form of 
reports of new lawyers' reactions to the experience they find in their 
law firms. To some degree, I believe the negative responses of many 
new initiates must be discounted - indeed rejected - as part of the 
problem that Judge Edwards has identified as the root of the decline in 
public responsibility in the law. The reality of an increasingly un-
forgiving marketplace has been uncongenial in part because of the un-
real and irresponsible attitudes of yuppie law graduates. It is precisely 
those new lawyers who have been the principle conduit to the law of 
the "narcissistic and self-indulgent individualism that emphasizes 
rights, downplays responsibilities, and constantly whines 'what's in it 
for me?' " 19 
Still, it cannot be denied that, in certain of its ramifications, the 
effects of this intensely competitive marketplace are felt especially by 
those new to the profession. As subordinate members of a team, they 
tend to see slivers of projects that are pulled together into a coherent 
package by someone else. Senior lawyers, responding to the pressures 
of the market and of the calendar, often neglect to share with their 
17. One friend of mine has observed that the value for legal business development in appear-
ing at continuing legal education programs is primarily in getting one's name, and hopefully 
one's picture, into the brochure that is mailed to thousands of in-house and outside lawyers. 
From the standpoint of efficient business promotion, he observes that it is regrettable that one 
cannot simply appear on the brochure and take a pass on preparing materials and making a 
presentation. 
18. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: 
The Economics of Associate Career Paths, 41 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1989); Johnson, supra note 7, at 
1242; Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Firm Practice, 
37 STAN. L. REv. 399 (1985). 
19. Judge Edwards includes this quotation from Roger Cramton to elaborate his first and 
apparently primary explanation for the decline in public spiritedness among the private bar. 
Edwards, supra note 3, at 1153 (quoting Roger C. Cramton, Professionalism, Legal Services and 
Lawyer Campetency, in AMER. BAR AssN., JUSTICE FOR A GENERATION 144, 153 (1985)). 
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younger colleagues a sense of the big picture that is being pursued in a 
given matter, even after the project has been completed. Young law-
yers are often treated and made to feel like pieceworkers. 
Young associates are subjected to intense work pressures of several 
different types, the least significant of which is the pressure simply to 
bill large numbers of hours. Of greater difficulty are the pressures si-
multaneously pressing young lawyers in opposite directions. One may 
be directed to produce a top-quality product by an unrealistic deadline 
or within budget limits set in order to meet client expectations. Not 
infrequently, lawyers must work hours which, reasonably or not, they 
feel constrained not to report, lest they appear inefficient or disappoint 
expectations that they believe others have. At that point, the pressure 
to bill hours begins to bite, not just as a priority in its own right, but as 
a pressure in tension with other perceived requirements. 
In addition, young associates sometimes bear much of the brunt of 
the marketing efforts, which most often are presented primarily as the 
promotion of a partner. As invested time which is not itself directly 
productive of firm income, these client development efforts must be 
pursued in parallel and in balance with one's billable efforts - work 
that must be done but for which one may receive little "credit." 
Add to all of this the downturn in firm fortunes in recent years, in 
which ever spiraling upward growth curves have flattened and in 
many cases been reversed, and the current high turnover within the 
associate ranks of large firms becomes understandable. In many large 
firms there have been layoffs of associates, and in those in which this 
has not occurred, the logistics of making partner in a pyramid whose 
base is no longer expanding are at best difficult. For many in the asso-
ciate ranks, life resembles Hobbes' state of nature - nasty, brutish 
and, by theirs or their firm's choice, short. 
There is no doubt that these pressures of the marketplace have 
borne adversely on the private practitioner's willingness or ability to 
dedicate time to public service in a variety of forms. Lawyers view 
themselves as having less time than previously to pursue various kinds 
of public service, and pro bono representation has been reduced in 
many firms.20 Sometimes public service work is undertaken, if at all, 
only on the basis of careful firm decisions to dedicate the efforts of 
certain persons for a predictable period of time. 
In sum, heightened competition in the marketplace for legal serv-
ices has contributed greatly to the decline in emphasis on service and 
20. Professor Gordon notes that "[t]he period from 1900-1975 may look thin on public ser-
vice compared to 1770-1860 or 1880-1900, but to many older lawyers it seems a true Golden 
Age compared to the present." Gordon, supra note 8, at 60. 
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stewardship among private practitioners. The fact that this narrowing 
of the attorney's field of view has some describable causes - and thus 
is not fairly viewed, as some have argued, simply as the result of greed, 
sloth, and small-mindedness - does not change the fact that practi-
tioners have come increasingly to view the law as a milieu for personal 
advancement and self-realization, rather than a calling whose critical 
features include service to the common good. 
III. ACADEMIA'S Loss OF LEGAL VOCATION 
The phenomenon observed by Judge Edwards and others21 as the 
failure of the academy to serve the courts and the practicing bar effec-
tively - indeed the rejection by increasing numbers in academia of the 
relevance and worth of practical legal education - is one that I am 
less qualified by experience to evaluate.22 Nonetheless, the signs ap-
pear overwhelming to me that pronµnent amidst a collection of other 
causative factors is the same loss, being experienced by the profession, 
of a vocation in the law as a fitting and needy object of service. 
Law, as the collective means by which we maintain social order 
through rules and processes for resolving disputes, has somehow come 
to seem unworthy of academic attention. Professor George Priest, for 
example, apparently views legal doctrine as "easy,"23 and the study of 
law as so inherently uninteresting that "those with true intellectual 
courage would abandon the law and become full-time social scien-
tists."24 As to those areas of theory and social science to which schol-
ars increasingly direct their efforts, there is frequently a distinct air of 
moral superiority. Unlike the profession, which is tarnished by its 
need to deal daily with clients and practical realities, the academy 
prides itself in being engaged in a quest for truth in a less cluttered 
setting.25 
It is thus not that academia is lacking in idealism. But the ideals to 
21. See, e.g., John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must 
Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL Enuc. 343 (1989); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's 
View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL Enuc. 313 (1989). 
22. It appears that the ability to generalize about the situation in academia is confined to 
particular subgroups among law schools. Judge Edwards' comments about the dominance of 
theoretical and social science scholarship and teaching appear to hold only at the 20 or so elite 
law schools. Moreover, the controversy about law school curricula is clearly not ended by a 
resolution that law school has a duty to serve the profession, the courts, and the law as an 
institution because there are a myriad of choices remaining about how one goes about accom-
plishing these objectives. See, e.g., Elson, supra note 21, at 349 (arguing for a "pedagogy suited 
to professional development," which is seen to be at odds with "the prevalent neutral doctrinal 
focus of most law school teaching"). 
23. Edwards, supra note 2, at 40. 
24. George L. Priest, supra note 5, at 439. 
25. See Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE 
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which it is tied are increasingly unrelated to any notion of service to 
the law as an institution or to the people who are governed by the law. 
The academy's tie to the real world, in which legal rules and institu-
tions either function effectively or fail to do so, is increasingly tenuous 
and incidental. Many law schools, like many law reviews, increasingly 
seem to exist not to meet a public need for effective education and 
scholarship relevant to the law as it is and could be, but rather to 
satisfy the desires of faculty and students for intellectual and moral 
gratification. This comes across clearly in Priest's notion of the future 
law school as a sort of supergraduate school in subjects of extreme 
specialization: 
The Enlightenment is coming. Its source seems to be the increasing spe-
cialization oflegal scholarship .... The law school will be comprised of a 
set of miniature graduate departments in the various disciplines. Intro-
ductory courses may be retained (if not shunted to colleges) .... The 
ambitious scholars on law-school faculties will insist on teaching subjects 
of increasingly narrow scope. The law-school curriculum will come to 
consist of graduate courses in applied economics, social theory, and 
political science. Specialization by students, which is to say, intensified 
study, follows necessarily.26 
What is neglected in this vision, or at least consigned a minor role to 
allow academics full room for personal growth and self-realization, is 
the focus on matters more fundamental to the real-life functioning of 
the legal system - like legal reasoning, doctrine, ethics, and an em-
phasis on the lawyer's responsibility to look after the effectiveness of 
legal processes. As Judge Edwards contends, these are hardly inconse-
quential matters.27 Moreover, Priest's vision is a far cry from the con-
cept of a university law school as Jefferson envisioned it, as a bridge 
between "the worlds of ideas and affairs, supporting traffic in both di-
rections to bring academic thought into contact with reality and prac-
tical governance into contact with disinterested inquiry, with benefits 
fl.owing in both directions. "28 
Looking at the current state of both private law practice and the 
law schools, it thus seems that concepts of service and stewardship -
of duty to the law as a vital public institution - have given way to a 
heightened focus on the personal advancement and self-realization of 
the individual lawyer or professor.29 Regardless of precisely how this 
L.J. 955 (1981) (arguing that law schools should view their role primarily as the cultivation of 
moral virtues, including the pursuit of truth). 
26. Priest, supra note 5, at 441. Priest's suggestion oddly echoes the increasingly specialized 
state of the legal profession. 
27. Edwards, supra note 2, at 61. 
28. Carrington, supra note 11, at 792 (describing Jefferson's view). 
29. This reality, derived here by extended discussion, is not lost on the general public. Hence 
August 1993] Stewardship 2159 
change has taken place, this development carries the implicit premise 
that the law can be taken for granted, that it is simply a "given" insti-
tution which offers an arena in which individual legal professionals do 
their stuff. 30 The obvious incorrectness of this premise offers the foun-
dation for a renewed focus on service and stewardship, by practition-
ers and professors alike. 
IV. THE NEED FOR SERVICE AND STEWARDSHIP IN LAW 
Judge Edwards has called for a renewed "public spiritedness" 
among lawyers.31 I would make the same point in a slightly different 
way. There is a need for a new emphasis on the lawyer's duty of ser-
vice to and stewardship for the law. Our system of legal rules and 
institutions has been enormously successful and produced great social 
good, as compared with legal institutions as they have existed 
throughout most of the rest of the world. But it is not self-perpetuat-
ing. If those who pursue their livelihood in the law do not assume 
responsibility for the maintenance, support, and improvement of legal 
institutions, who will? 
In major part, this is indeed a call for rejection of the self-realiza-
tion model of professional life, which Judge Edwards has decried. As 
Roger Cramton said, "[t]he strident vulgarity of our materialistic cul-
ture, with its extraordinary emphasis on individual self-realization 
(frequently forgetting that our individual identity is shaped by the 
community of which we are part), does push selfish advantage to the 
fore and erode communal values."32 Lawyers and law professors need 
to make adult decisions, much as does a new parent, to take seriously 
the long-term responsibility that they bear. This duty is not a denial of 
the increasingly competitive environment in which practitioners work, 
nor of the challenge and attraction of theoretical scholarship. It is 
simply a recognition of a higher calling, a duty of service and steward-
ship to the rule of law. 
One cannot observe the state of the world today without being 
struck by the fact that law as a system of predictable rules evenhand-
edly applied, within which individuals freely go about their business, 
is, for the run of mankind, not to be taken for granted. Somalia's rov-
the oft-heard comment that the only ones who benefit from involving lawyers in a problem are 
the lawyers themselves. 
30. Priest came close to making precisely this statement in describing the social science aca-
demic's view of law as "a constraint on individual behavior" that is lacking in theoretical interest 
precisely because it is taken "as given." Priest, supra note 5, at 438. 
31. Edwards, supra note 3, at 1150. 
32. Roger C. Cramton, The Trouble with Lawyers (and Law Schools}, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 
359, 361 (1985). 
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ing gangs and vacuum of central authority, and the former Yugosla-
via's nationalist carnage among aspiring ethnic states, are but two of 
the most recent and obvious examples of total breakdown. The 
problems of the former Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe, of imple-
menting rules for private interaction and economic development on 
the foundation of long-term submissiveness to a central authority, are 
less catastrophic but no less sobering illustrations of law's contingent 
nature. More generally, even where order does not seem to be in 
doubt at a given moment, the norm throughout the world is much 
more that of major and petty tyrannies than of legal rules reliably ap-
plied to protect the rights of even the unpopular. The periodic in-
stances of mob violence in the United States make clear that we are 
not immune from the breakdown of social order that is a way of life 
throughout much of the world. 
Thus, one need not be a Chicken Little to suggest that the contin-
ued viability our legal system is not entirely free from doubt.33 The 
remarkable popular hostility to lawyers as a profession is only the 
most immediate barometer of the level of public dissatisfaction with 
the workings of the legal system. 34 There is much to dislike in the 
ways of the law. All of us in the profession are well aware of the ever-
growing complexity and confusion of legal rules and regimes, and of 
the glut of litigation that clogs our courts. Dispute resolution is too 
expensive to be available to any but large corporations and the most 
wealthy individuals. Yet those of more modest means also have needs. 
There is the problem of criminal enforcement; every few years we have 
multiplied our expenditures in enforcement and litigation dollars with 
little noticeable positive effect on the state of public order. In an era of 
declining economic expectations, the stresses on the systems for main-
tenance of civil order will be accentuated, and these and other short-
comings will become even more significant. All of these developments 
seem to proceed in parallel with a decline in civility and mutual re-
spect among those involved in the law. These are not the signs of a 
healthy enterprise. 
All of our efforts will be required to meet the challenges that the 
33. Derek Bok's comments 10 years ago stand as a near total indictment of the practical 
functioning of our legal system. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 
33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 570 (1983). While not everyone agrees with Bok, I am familiar with no one 
who thinks that the situation has improved since that time. 
34. It is indicative, as Judge Edwards has pointed out, that in 1990 the President's press 
secretary could conclude that the possibility of electoral advantage was all on the side of bashing 
lawyers and state publicly that "lawyers certainly deserve all the criticism they can get . . •• 
Those are universally held feelings by everyone who has ever dealt with the legal establishment." 
Lisa Gelb, Talking of Lawyers, WASH. PoST, May 8, 1990, at BS, quoted in Edwards, supra note 
3, 1149. 
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years ahead will bring. Apart from the dedication of time to law re-
form and other efforts directed at strengthening our legal institutions, 
lawyers in their daily work must reflect a realization that it is the 
fabric of social order with which they are dealing. The adversary sys-
tem's ethical mandate of nearly unchecked, zealous advocacy thus de-
serves a serious look, with an eye toward its effect of reducing the 
lawyer's position to that of an amoral actor, capable of immense harm 
in the name of professional duty. One aspect of the lawyer's duty that 
cannot be ignored, however inconvenient it may be, is the provision of 
basic legal services to the needy. When all is said and done, lawyers in 
our society must work harder to temper the various roles that they are 
employed to play with substantial consideration of what it is necessary 
for them to do if the legal process is to function effectively and serve its 
purpose. 
It is less easy for me to say what role the academy should play than 
to say that a duty of stewardship for the law should be at the heart of 
its work. It does seem clear that law professors should focus princi-
pally on the problems of law and legal systems. Law schools must 
assume an obligation to identify and hand down the ideals and ethical 
values of the profession if they are to be preserved. They must en-
courage creativity and idealism in the context not just of wholly theo-
retical matters, but of day-to-day work within the legal system. The 
academy should probably spend more time than it does addressing 
matters of legal doctrine and training law students in the techniques of 
reading cases and construing statutes, which are the tools oflegal anal-
ysis. 35 At the same time, legal theory, economics, and other areas of 
social science can be essential to the development of the normative side 
of a lawyer who acts out of a greater public purpose. But these sub-
jects should be taught in a manner relevant to preparation for a career 
of service in the law.36 Scholars who do not wish to make legal issues 
and the effective functioning of the legal system their ultimate subject 
35. As Dean Griswold has observed: 
The law schools should remember more clearly that they do not need to teach their students 
all the law. What the students should be taught is the background, the spirit, the traditions, 
the methods - how to deal with questions, how to make themselves expert on new ques-
tions in a relatively short time. This is after all really about what the finished practitioner 
knows. 
See Erwin N. Griswold, Speech at the T.C. Williams School of Law of the University of Rich-
mond (Oct. 15, 1954) (transcript on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
36. Legal writing, as obviously fundamental as it is, is given short shrift at most Jaw schools. 
The answer that college graduates should come to Jaw school able to write clear, simple English 
is correct but too often contrary to reality. Law schools must provide the training necessary to 
bring their students to a level of basic functionality or decline to let them graduate. This means 
something more than a pass-fail course taught by teaching assistants. 
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matter should seek appointment elsewhere than in a school where peo-
ple come to be trained as lawyers. 
The precise balance between the teaching of doctrine, legal analy-
sis, clinical subjects, ethics, social science, and theory37 is ultimately 
less important than the need for those subjects to be taught by some-
one with a mission to support and strengthen our system of laws, who 
presents the subject matter from the perspective of its relevance to law 
as it functions in the real world. From the perspective of stewardship 
to the law, what is most "practical,"38 to use Judge Edwards' term, is 
a balance of work focused both on essential knowledge and skills and 
on normative and theoretical concerns, with the latter presented sym-
pathetically from the perspective of one who takes the rule of law per-
sonally and wants it to succeed. 39 
While I agree with much that Judge Edwards has proposed, I thus 
submit that his formulations of the problem are partial - a bit like 
those of the blind men examining different parts of the elephant. The 
law's current unhappiness is only partly described as that of law 
schools and practicing lawyers going in different directions, of law 
practice becoming too commercial, or of law schools failing to serve 
the needs of the practicing lawyers and judges with practical teaching 
and scholarship. All of these observations, while correct as far as they 
go, miss the root of the problem, which has a common solution - the 
reinvigoration of those in the law With a sense of duty and vocation for 
the legal institutions of which we are all stewards. 
37. The subject of how the law school "preparation of lawyers for practice could be im· 
proved" is discussed in detail, with reference to particular skills and information needed to be 
mastered, in the 1992 Report of the ABA Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession. 
LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 6, at 123-221. 
38. Edwards, supra note 2, at 35. 
39. I doubt that law schools should attempt to address or simulate extensively in a clinical 
setting a wide range of the practical realities that a lawyer is likely to meet in practice. But see 
Elson, supra note 21, at 345-46 (noting that the "most obvious failing of the traditional law 
school curriculum" is in neglecting a multitude of general and specific competencies that mark 
the excellent practitioner). Such an approach will ultimately fail to provide more than a fleeting 
exposure to a few real -life situations, while foreclosing pursuit of a range of doctrinal and theo-
retical subject matter that will be less easily acquired after law school. 
